The Boeing Saga Grows Even Darker

Some strange things are afoot

Boeing's offices in Arlington County, Virginia, the corporate headquarters of the company as of 2022. By mr_t_77, CC BY-SA 2.0.

Two months ago, I wrote of the incident involving Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 in which a door plug blew off the side of a 737 Max-9 as the plane climbed out of Oregon. When the event hit the media, a sordid storyline came to light of the change in Boeing’s corporate culture.

Basically, after its merger with McDonnell Douglas, Boeing turned its priorities toward coddling shareholders, regardless of the effect on its safety procedures. As the Flight 1282 event exemplified, the impact was substantially negative. The decline may have started, or at least rapidly accelerated, with the research, development, and deployment of the Max series jets. I quoted aviation history Graham Simons’s view on the matter:

In my view, the Max was a series of modifications too far. They should have never come out with it in the first place. They should have sat down with a blank computer screen to design an entirely new aircraft.

The deficiencies in the Max 737-8 became tragically apparent following back-to-back incidents. Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 and Lion Air Flight 610 crashed months apart in 2018 and 2019, both with a major causal factor involving the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS).

Boeing designed this software system because it attempted to re-outfit the 737 aircraft, originally built in the 1960s, into a jet with several modern improvements that did not neatly fit into the older design. Specifically the new, more efficient engines would not fit under the wings the way previous engines did.

The workaround Boeing used required mounting the engines further forward, which disrupted the airflow over the wings and affected the flight controls during certain pitch attitudes. MCAS was meant to automatically correct this problem.

Design problems contributed to the two crashes, but a more nefarious issue may have played a larger role. For reasons related to preventing any delay in the rollout of the Max—and the likely loss of revenue that might follow such a delay—Boeing all but concealed the very existence of the MCAS system. Two sources told the Wall Street Journal:

Boeing test pilots and senior pilots involved in the MAX’s development didn’t receive detailed briefings about how fast or steeply the automated system known as MCAS could push down a plane’s nose…. Nor were they informed that the system relied on a single sensor—rather than two—to verify the accuracy of incoming data about the angle of a plane’s nose.

The Lion Air pilots did not know the MCAS existed at all, let alone how to counteract any mistaken inputs caused by it. While the Ethiopian pilots were aware, they nevertheless did not know how to appropriately respond to correct the plane’s flight. Moreover, in the Ethiopian incident, the series of events that took down the aircraft began with a faulty sensor—the only one feeding information to the MCAS. Relying on a single sensor in commercial aviation is a textbook mistake.

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that Boeing’s attempted coverup in those cases warranted criminal charges. A while later, Boeing settled with the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and agreed to pay a fine of $2.5 billion. In its press release, the DOJ stated:

The tragic crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 exposed fraudulent and deceptive conduct by employees of one of the world’s leading commercial airplane manufacturers… Boeing’s employees chose the path of profit over candor by concealing material information from the FAA concerning the operation of its 737 Max airplane and engaging in an effort to cover up their deception… The misleading statements, half-truths, and omissions communicated by Boeing employees to the FAA impeded the government’s ability to ensure the safety of the flying public.

Several events occurred since those two crashes that highlighted major failures in Boeing’s safety policies; the Alaska Air blowout was only the tip of the iceberg.

Finance over engineering and safety

Boeing’s eroding safety culture parallels its increasing emphasis on finance over engineering and safety. Kathy Gill from the Moderate Voice, aptly summed up the shift:

The Boeing board should have fired ALL C-suite executives by the end of 2020. Instead, the Board made The Blackstone Group/Nielsen Holdings/General Electric alum David L. Calhoun the CEO. (Not an engineer: all finance, all the time.) Calhoun had sat on the board while McDonnell Douglas alumni, financiers not engineers, made decisions that led directly to those 346 deaths [the Lion Air and Ethiopia Airlines fatalities].

Boeing has replaced human workers with “smart tools” in its inspector corps, has engaged in union busting activities that included various efforts at intimidation, and has been sued in a class action for negligence and safety violations by workers at one of its subsidiary vendors.

When even some shareholders sought to implement changes by requiring that Boeing employ a minimum number of aerospace, aviation, or engineering executives, the company responded that such a requirement was “impermissibly vague and indefinite so as to be materially false and misleading.” Boeing wants only financiers running the company, not people who know about flying or aeronautics.

Throughout all this, the previous CEO, Dennis Muilenburg, left with $21 million in pay in 2020, and in 2022 Boeing raised the current CEO David Calhoun’s pay to $22.5 million. Between 2012 and 2022 Boeing spent $40 billion in stock buybacks and paid $22 billion in dividends, while simultaneously cutting 20,000 jobs. Boeing also ranks 9^th in lobbying spending since 1998.

The Darker Part

When an incident of any significance occurs on a commercial airliner, the NTSB typically launches an investigation in an attempt to determine what happened and to improve future policies or standards. Under the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), title 49, §§ 830.1 and 830.2, commercial airliners are required to report any “occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or could affect the safety of operations.” Section 830.10 requires the airline to preserve various records and evidence immediately following a reportable incident.

This is important to what has recently happened, so here are the relevant sections of the law:

A) The operator of an aircraft involved in an accident or incident for which notification must be given is responsible for preserving to the extent possible any aircraft wreckage, cargo, and mail aboard the aircraft, and all records, including all recording mediums of flight, maintenance, and voice recorders, pertaining to the operation and maintenance of the aircraft and to the airmen until the Board takes custody thereof or a release is granted pursuant to § 831.12(b) of this chapter.

C) Where it is necessary to move aircraft wreckage, mail or cargo, sketches, descriptive notes, and photographs shall be made, if possible, of the original positions and condition of the wreckage and any significant impact marks.

D) The operator of an aircraft involved in an accident or incident shall retain all records, reports, internal documents, and memoranda dealing with the accident or incident, until authorized by the Board to the contrary. [Emphasis added]

On March 13, the chair of the NTSB, Jennifer Homendy, wrote a letter to US senators stating that Boeing had overwritten security footage related to the installation or maintenance of the door plug that blew off the Alaska Airlines flight. The NTSB first requested this information on January 9. Boeing claims this footage is automatically deleted after 30 days, and the repair work occurred on the door plug on October 31—more than 2 months before the NTSB’s request.

There is a certain irony there given that Boeing holds a patent for a Data Retention Management system. The description opens as follows:

Large organizations such as businesses, governments, and other institutions commonly generate volumes of data in the process of their operations. The data may be organized into business records which comprise a plurality of data elements. The business records and their constituent data elements may be subject to one or more data retention policies. Accordingly, systems, methods, and computer program products manage data archival processes in complex organizations may find utility.

In any event, whether or not the company overwrote the video in accordance with its usual practices, the suspicious activity did not stop there. When also asked about the written records documenting the work on the door plug, Boeing allegedly told the NTSB that they are “unable to find” them.

CFR title 14, Chapter 1, Subchapter G, § 121.707(b) requires that airlines “shall keep a copy of each report of a major repair available for inspection.” Section 121.701 states that airlines “shall have an approved procedure for keeping adequate copies of the record required.” Being unable to “find” a repair record at a major airline is not simply a small problem of disorganization. It sounds more like obstruction than mistake.

Additionally, Boeing still has not identified what employee performed the work on the Alaska Air door plug. As a result, the NTSB asked for the name of the entire team of workers who routinely conduct maintenance on door plugs. According to the NTSB, Boeing has not complied with that request either.

It has countered, however, stating “Early in the investigation, we provided the NTSB with names of Boeing employees, including door specialists, who we believed would have relevant information. We have now provided the full list of individuals on the 737 door team, in response to a recent request.” But, what it said next gives credence to skeptics of Boeing’s intent to cooperate. “If the door plug removal was undocumented there would be no documentation to share.”

Homendy characterized Boeing’s conduct in the investigation as “absurd” and “really disappointing.”

Then there is the incident involving John Barnett. Retiring in 2017, Barnett worked for Boeing for 32 years and recently became involved in litigation against the company. Characterized by the media as a “whistleblower,” police found Barnett dead in a Charleston, South Carolina hotel parking lot on or around March 10. He reportedly died of a gunshot wound while sitting in his car. So far, the coroner’s office has stated that the wound appears self-inflicted. Among other things, Barnett had publicly accused Boeing of putting profits over safety. Hear him in his own words here:

Update: The video apparently no longer exists.

Suspicions about Barnett’s death quickly rose when a family friend identified only as Jennifer told ABC4 that Barnett had said to her, “No, I ain’t scared, but if anything happens to me, it’s not suicide.”

The statement came from a conversation the two were allegedly having regarding his upcoming final deposition against the company. Barnett’s attorneys expressed their own concern about his death, telling the media:

John was in the midst of a deposition in his whistleblower retaliation case, which finally was nearing the end. He was in very good spirits and really looking forward to putting this phase of his life behind him and moving on. We didn’t see any indication he would take his own life. No one can believe it.

Boeing, in response to inquiries by the media, released a statement saying only, “We are saddened by Mr. Barnett’s passing, and our thoughts are with his family and friends.” Barnett’s family released a statement of their own claiming he suffered from PTSD and anxiety “as a result of being subjected to the hostile work environment at Boeing.” Police continue to investigate.

So Many Incidents, So Little Time

The Alaska Air blowout occurred on January 5, 2024. Since then, Boeing has wracked up incidents like a gambler wracks up debts.

• On January 13, a Boeing 737-800 cancelled its takeoff after a cockpit window cracked.

• Four days later, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken switched planes when the Boeing C-40 he boarded suffered an oxygen leak.

• On January 19, a Boeing 747 cargo plane made an emergency landing after witnesses saw flames shooting out from beneath it. A source told NBC News that investigators found “a softball sized hole above the #2 engine.”

• The very next day, a Boeing 757 lost its nose wheel just before taking off from Atlanta. Laden with passengers, the pilots learned of the problem from another Delta pilot who radioed, “Delta 982 this is the aircraft looking at you. One of your nose tires just came off, it just rolled off the runway behind you.” Boeing released a statement saying, “We apologize to our customers for the inconvenience.”

• On March 7, passengers aboard a Boeing 737-900 videotaped flames shooting out of one of the engines on a United flight. The cause remains unknown.

• The next day, Flight 1539—a Boeing 737-8—reported that after touchdown the rudder pedals “stuck” while the plane rolled to a stop. Rudder pedals help steer the aircraft.

• On March 12, fifty people were injured on a Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner when the aircraft plummeted 500 feet in a few seconds. The pilot purportedly stated that “My gauges went down; everything went down for one or two seconds, and they just lit up again and continued to function.”

Fix or Finished

Make no mistake, flying remains the safest form of transportation on the planet. The list of incidents above represents a miniscule fraction of the daily air traffic in the United States alone. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the US averages 45,000 domestic flights every single day.

Nevertheless, every air crash is an extraordinary trauma. Boeing commercial flights carry anywhere from around 150 to 190 passengers on 737s, to as many as 514 on the triple seven, and around 600 to 660 on the various models of 747 (though only 50 remain in passenger service).

A single plane going down affects tens of thousands of families, friends, and others. And because of the unique fears some associate with flying (i.e. dropping out of the sky), nearly every air crash results in a significant blow to the industry. Despite the fact that few of the recent incidents caused injury, their persistence in happening will spell the end for this company that was once viewed as a marvel in engineering.

The United States government finally seems to be taking seriously the litany of issues with Boeing. It is quite late, but better than never. Where it truly has failed, however, is in allowing this to happen in the first place.

Over the past few decades, no government authority appears to be serious about halting the enshittification of anything. Nearly every industry wishes only to squeeze every last dime out of its customers, with zero regard for quality. Google, Netflix, Amazon, Facebook, Roku… the number goes on so far it would require reams of pages to list them all. But, there is a stark difference between destroying some social media platform or inundating customers with ads and failing to conduct quality work in the aerospace industry. When the enshittification happens at an airline, people die. It is time for the government to step in, dismantle the executive structure of this company (and maybe indict some of them), and forcefully restore its safety practices.

Enough is enough.

To read about an incident involving a Boeing from long ago in which the pilots performed a near miracle, click below.

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