Absurd Arguments for American 'Victory' in Iran

Complex matters can't be resolved with simplistic responses

Recently, someone commented at length on my first article about how the war in Iran will end. The commenter does not appear to be a bot—he has published several articles on Medium—and the arguments he presented have been made by people I know in the real world. It is for the latter reason I believe it is important to respond.

How the War in Iran Ends

If you find this newsletter informative and care to offer a little something in support, feel free to buy me a coffee or upgrade to a paid sub. For those of you who prefer storytelling and art over this fictionalized reality we are living through, check out my other site, Inverted Umbrella.

Now, to the business at hand…

Photo by Dawn McDonald on Unsplash

If people obtain their information about the Iran war solely from corporate western media and the statements of certain politicians, then it is understandable they might think everything about the war in Iran is going as planned (and that there actually was a plan). Examining a much broader array of sources, however, indicates unequivocally this is wrong.

Here, we parse a few of the arguments put forth by those who’ve been persuaded the war is going swimmingly. While these are all derived from that single comment mentioned in the intro, I have heard similar renditions from people in real life. These represent only a part of the original comment, but the focus is on the points repeated elsewhere.

Argument 1:

Actually, the US has already won, but the media can’t see it. At this point, the US is simply trying to determine how much of Iran they want to leave intact for humanitarian reasons, since our war is not with the Iranian people, but the government regime.

This paragraph contains many nonsensical statements. On its most base level, “our war is not with the Iranian people” contradicts facts no one disputes. US officials—as boasted about by the President himself on social media—have threatened to kill everyone, not just the ‘regime,’ everyone in Iran. American and Israeli forces have bombed schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure thousands of times, essentially confirming the authenticity (if not the practicality) of those threats. Imagine trying to argue this is “not a war with the Iranian people” to an Iranian person.

To state the “US has already won” requires first outlining the objectives, then showing America has achieved them. American officials have offered mixed messaging on the purpose behind the war since the first day, but we can focus on four objectives Trump laid out on March 2:

• Destroy Iran’s missile capabilities;

• Destroy Iran’s navy;

• Ensure Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon;

• Ensure Iran cannot arm, fund, and direct terrorist armies outside their borders.

Of these, only two have seen some success—damage to Iran’s navy and missile capabilities. Centcom has proclaimed to have destroyed at least sixty ships though, notably, Centcom is hardly a reliable source of reporting. I analyzed a table of every reported strike, created by Benjamin Jensen, director of Futures Lab and a senior fellow at the Defense and Security Department. Here’s what I found:

Of nine entries on the table (that outline dozens of incidents), five rely solely on Centcom’s pronouncements. These unverified assertions claim:

• Iran’s ‘flagship drone carrier’ was sunk;

• 60 ‘surface combatants’ were ‘struck’ (not destroyed);

• 30 ships have been ‘sunk’

Since there is no proof offered for any of these claims, it is impossible to say with certainty how badly Iran’s navy has suffered.

Regardless, even if General Dan Caine’s declaration that 90% of Iran’s navy is destroyed is accurate, the IRGC’s “mosquito fleet” remains largely intact and active. It consists of “small boats, as well as miniature submarines and marine drones.” This fleet enforces Iran’s rules in the Strait of Hormuz. Reports based on satellite imagery show some Iranian submarines also still exist. Therefore, while Iran’s navy has unquestionably been damaged, it has not been destroyed, and 90% is probably not an accurate accounting.

What about missile capability?

America’s own intelligence reported Iran maintains at least 50% of its missile and drone capability as of April 2. On April 17, a senior IDF official (Israeli Defense Force) put the number of remaining missile launchers at 40%, but noted the Iranians can easily “restock its arsenal of ballistic missiles.” Now, just a day or two ago, a leaked CIA report puts the number of launchers at 75% and missiles at 70%. The Iranians claim the number is much higher.

Moreover, as recently as in the last few weeks, Iran received shipments of chemicals to fuel these missiles from China. So, destruction of Iran’s missile and drone capability has not happened. If anything, it has been impaired, but by how much is unclear.

The other two points are nonstarters. Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis continue operations unabated. And, as the IDF official referred to above himself admitted, “Iran has the capability to enrich uranium to a military grade of 90% and close in on a nuclear weapon.” Even if he is lying, there is no evidence Iran’s nuclear capability has been affected by the war so far, according to American intelligence’s own reporting.

Another objective that has been mentioned from time to time (and at other times denied as an objective) is ‘regime change.’ I wrote a lengthy piece on why that was a virtually impossible goal from the beginning, and remains so today. There is no need to rehash that much more detailed argument here.

Regime Change in Iran Is a Nonstarter

Argument 2:

The longer the US chooses to keep the blockade in place, the more damage it will do to Iran’s energy infrastructure and their customer’s demand. Iran is running out of capacity to store oil and will need to cap wells soon. Capping wells creates major upfront cost to put them back online. Oil revenues have been the primary means of funding Iran’s defense, without them, it will have to squeeze its citizens that are already unhappy with the lack of prosperity in a country that should be among the most prosperous in the world.

Further damage to Iran’s energy infrastructure certainly will happen if the war goes hot once again, and a continued blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will affect the country’s bottom line, but Iran has a lot of time before the closure of the Strait triggers a deeper economic crisis in the country. Indeed, the global economic crisis may well come before any domestic emergency forces the Iranians to alter their strategy.

Stephen Innes, managing partner at SPI Asset Management, claims if Iran is forced to shut down production, it could be Iran’s oil sector’s “endgame.” Thus, it would seem that maintaining the blockade for another month would bring Iran to its knees. But the situation is proceeding differently.

Amena Bakr, head of Mideast energy research from Kpler, said “Iran is running out of storage, but it's closer to 20 days at current production levels.” Mohamad Elmasry, professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, added that Iran’s “floating storage” can hold an additional 127 million barrels or so (that would add approximately fifty days, or more if production is slowed, before reaching storage capacity). The country also exports about 20% of its oil through other avenues aside from the Strait. Wholly shutting down wells is not likely to be an issue for some time yet.

On this issue of a rapid, forced capitulation through a blockade, Trita Parsi, co-founder and Executive Vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, wrote, “[this is] the latest in a long line of delusional silver bullets that American presidents have chased.” Dr. Parsi believes the pressure from the damage to the global economy is far more acute than that imposed upon the Iranians. Iranian Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi pointed out the Iranians have been dealing with oil production caps as a result of sanctions for decades. Oil producers in Iran, he continued, are adept at maneuvering production to deal with capacity issues (see around the 12:30 mark).

Another problem with this argument is the American blockade is porous. Lloyd’s of London reported 26 Iranian ships successfully evaded the blockade in the first week and offloaded their oil onto other ships while at sea. Iranian ships are still succeeding at this, though how many is unclear, but those evasions are effectively proof it can be done.

Iran has other options to avert this economic “chokehold.” Its Caspian Sea fleet can move goods back and forth to Russia and other countries, including oil. Iranian trucks can move goods across the Bazargan border crossing (on the Turkish border near Iran’s Azerbaijani province). In the first three months of 2026, 45,000 trucks made the crossing, an average rate, suggesting it could be amped up. A railway connecting Iran to China that can also move supplies enters the country through Golestan province, which is situated on the border with Turkmenistan. Furthermore, in what’s been called a “double deal” or “betrayal,” Pakistan just opened six land crossings with Iran, allowing thousands of containers of cargo to pass.

Iranian oil exports comprise just 40% of the country’s total exports, suggesting it can weather the economic storm, even if it is forced to cap wells because it reaches oil storage capacity, by utilizing these other avenues to move goods. The CIA report cited above predicts the country can endure for at least another 3 to 6 months without any significant disruption.

The pressure on economies around the globe is likely to have a greater effect on the trajectory of events than the suffering in Iran. In Asian countries, there is an abundance of fuel shortages and rationing right now. The stranding of LNG, petrochemicals, and various other materials raises the risk of food instability and manufacturing decline. Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Asia all face an imminent jet fuel crisis. If the blockade of the Strait drags on, expect affected polities to exert stiffer pressure on the Trump administration to negotiate (legitimately, not on social media or by violating any ceasefire).

There is also the Axis factor. China and Russia—members of the so-called Axis of Resistance—clearly wish to see the Iranians win, or at least humiliate the Americans, and could therefore exert their own pressure on the US. (Some reports indicate they already are applying such pressure). Moreover, even if Iran runs into economic problems that exceed its ability to manage, those countries could provide some form of aid or loans. This wouldn’t last forever, but could persist long enough to potentially force the Americans’ hand on the back of the global economic crisis. So, it is far from clear the US has the capacity to, as the commenter put it, “crank down Iran’s economy more and more until it agrees to Trump’s demands.”

On a last note, many have suggested the economic pain in Iran, if it lasts a long time, could incite the citizenry to turn against the government. Given the country has been under the burden of economic sanctions for nearly half a century, it has learned how to sustain itself under intense economic pressure. This hardly seems like a valve at risk of bursting.

What’s more, the attacks on civilians seems to have galvanized them behind the Iranian government (something attacks on civilians tend to do even if their government was not well-liked prior to the attacks). Mahmood OD, a respected Palestinian YouTuber, provided video evidence of massive demonstrations against the US and Israel—not the Iranian government—on May 3 or 4. A month ago, news outlets in Iran showed similar evidence.

Continued threats by Trump and his henchmen to “obliterate” Iranian society only seem to strengthen the resolve of both the Iranian government and people.

Argument 3:

With Iran’s oil off the market, those countries not exporting through the Strait of Hormuz will start pumping like crazy to cash in on the oil prices today. Arab countries still exporting through the strait are already building alternatives.

The argument here seems to be that OPEC countries have sufficient alternative transport mechanisms to continue providing the world enough oil to mitigate the energy shock or to ice Iran out of the market (maybe after the war? I’m not sure if that’s part of the meaning here). Regardless, this is wrong on two levels.

First, the obvious alternative to moving oil through the Strait is to pipe oil to the Red Sea. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates alternative routes for Middle Eastern oil can service about 3.3 to 5.5 million barrels per day (mbpd). That represents at most a quarter of the overall daily amount that typically flows through the Strait. Insufficient volume aside, if the situation escalates, the Houthis could put an end to that oil escaping the Red Sea, as they’ve exhibited the ability to do before.

Doron Peskin, writing for the Calcalist, an Israeli financial daily, summed it up:

Even after weeks of full-scale logistical mobilization, the region is managing to export only about half its normal volume. The conclusion is unavoidable: the emerging network of bypass routes is not a strategic replacement, but a temporary and costly stopgap.

Second, there is no viable alternative for rerouting LNG, which is as critical to the global economy as oil. If the Strait remains blocked, nearly 20% of the world’s LNG supply simply remains off the market, as do many of its byproducts (that are used to make fertilizer, among other things).

Already, this has been disastrous for farmers around the world, and has been exacerbated by the reduction of China’s exports of these products. The price of LNG was up by 33% at the end of April. In America, 70% of farmers reported they cannot afford all the fertilizer they need, potentially resulting in reduced planting or production. In poorer countries and those heavily reliant on Middle Eastern LNG, the situation is worse. The net effect is going to be higher food prices in the west and, possibly, food instability in the Global South. A large regional or even global food crisis will put immense pressure on the Americans to end the war.

Argument 4:

Just like the Ukraine war had some short-term impact on the global economy through the loss of Ukrainian wheat and Russian energy, the world adapted. The article does not account for this adaptation process.

Many comparisons to the 2022 economic shock related to the Russo-Ukrainian war have been made, but they are inapt. Compared to the loss of oil then, the loss now is 12 times per day greater—or 1 mbpd compared to 12 mbpd. But oil isn’t the only issue—LNG, LPG, and various byproducts also have been frozen. The IEA is calling this circumstance, “the worst energy crisis the ​world has faced.” During the war so far, the LNG lost from the market is nearly double that lost during the initial phases of the situation in Europe in 2022.

At the current point in the conflict, losses more closely parallel those from the 1973 oil embargo, but in a shorter amount of time. There is no magical “adaptation” pill the world can swallow to make the situation ‘all better.’ Adapting to such a profound loss to the global energy supply will happen through demand destruction if the war persists for long, but this is not a swift or comfortable process.

Demand destruction is when a long-term or even permanent decline in demand for a certain commodity occurs. It is driven by high prices, low supply, or both. Demand destruction in this case could manifest in the form of accelerating investment into alternative energies, such as wind, solar, or nuclear as well as a return to staple (and dirty) energy sources of the past, like coal. Oil and gas wouldn’t disappear, but the world would come to rely on them less.

In many countries, though, this will take years to accomplish. For the short term, people will have to give up certain activities or products because they will be unavailable or prohibitively expensive. The longer the war goes on, especially if there is a resurgence of attacks on energy and other facilities, the more severe and prolonged the pain people will face.

The arguments are absurd, but the belief in them is not

The commenter’s opening statement (depicted above as part of argument 1) reflects the belief system from which he argues. His comment about how “the media can’t see it” indicates a conspiratorial mindset, no doubt influenced or even developed by reliance on the comments of American officials. Brendan Carr, chair of the FCC, for example, wrote on X:

Broadcasters that are running hoaxes and news distortions - also known as the fake news - have a chance now to correct course before their license renewals come up.

Attached to Carr’s post was one by Donald Trump in which he proclaimed it was ‘fake news’ that American airplanes had been damaged while parked at a Saudi airbase around the end of March. The story was indeed true, with one of the planes (an E-3 Sentry AWACS) completely destroyed (with pictures circulating that proved it).

If one were to take Trump’s and other American officials’ comments as universally true, one could easily accept that the US “has already won.” Discerning otherwise requires work, especially if the goal is to not rely solely upon American media for information. But if the individual wants to believe America has ‘already won,’ the analysis stops there.

It is entirely understandable why someone would want to believe ‘we won.’ National pride, hope for the imminent drop in gas and other prices, or mere partisan capture all can drive this desire. Nevertheless, desire doesn’t substitute for reality. I have not yet seen a single claim of the US ‘winning’ in any meaningful sense that bore much in the way of credibility. Experts of numerous fields, from numerous places around the world, have offered their analyses and it is upon them, multiple media sources, and others in a position of knowledge (and upon our own internal logic) that we should rely to make our own assessments.

We have seen the damage this war has caused already, and not just in the Middle East. The economic pressure is intense in many places. Fuel lines and changes to conduct in response to gas shortages have happened. Food instability or outright famine could happen.

Americans have only felt a modicum of pain so far, primarily in the form of substantially higher gasoline prices and a CPI that is creeping upward. That, too, will speed up over time if this thing goes on. Without question, there is no real ‘win’ for anyone in this situation, at least in the short to medium term. But in the long-term, it appears some polities may benefit from political and strategic shifts.

Whether one views those shifts as good or bad will depend on A) how they ultimately play out, B) where one lives when they do, and C) how much damage is incurred before they happen.

China, Iran & the War... Imminent Global Shift?